It was my hope that a full-scale intellectual biography of Currie's unusual career would help to set the record straight and highlight his many insufficiently appreciated contributions to political economy both in the New Deal and in the field of development theory and policy.
Researching Currie's early years: records and reminiscences
Currie was born on October 8, 1902 in a small fishing village in Nova Scotia where his father had built up a substantial fleet of sailing vessels. But his father died when Currie was only four and his mother, a schoolteacher, moved to the nearby town of Bridgewater.
He attended schools in Nova Scotia, apart from two years when his family stayed with relatives in Massachusetts and California. Young was lured to the LSE in 1927 to take over Edwin Cannan's chair of political economy but died suddenly in March 1929 during an influenza epidemic at the early age of 52. Currie was scheduled to be Young's teaching assistant in monetary economics had Young stayed at Harvard. Instead, John H. Williams became his formal PhD supervisor but his research was initially guided by Young.
ii He was assistant to Young's temporary replacement, Ralph Hawtrey, in 1927-28, and later to Joseph Schumpeter. His PhD thesis, submitted in January 1931, was on Banking Theory and Bank Assets. Here he exposed the fallacies of the real bills doctrine and was one of the very few who at the time blamed Federal Reserve Board policies for the Great Depression. His diagnosis was very similar to that given much later in Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz's (1963) celebrated monetary history, in which, however, Currie's contributions were ignored (see Laidler, 1993, and 1999, chapter 9 In a letter to me, June 28, 1987, Currie denounced Schumpeter as a 'mountebank'. iv A biographer may nowhere find in the published record such throwaway remarks. Yet this kind of information can cast new light on key events and characters and breathe life into the history. Access to the subject's other correspondence files, diaries and memoirs also helps of course; but the biographer's own correspondence and interviews can add greatly to that body of informal information. Most helpful of all is the opportunity to listen to the subject in person and note the tone of voice: bitter or relaxed; mellow or rancorous.
In the case of Schumpeter, a policy nihilist in the depths of depression, one hears Currie relate contemptuously how in his lectures he would suddenly stop in mid sentence, ostentatiously clasp his forehead, pull a paper from his pocket and scribble a note. 'It was probably his laundry list,' scoffed Currie. 'His only solution for depression was to let wages fall. Other than his own, of course. He even voted to reduce the tea ladies' wages.'
In similar vein Currie would rail against Herbert Hoover's mean-minded Puritanism that upheld the virtues of 'fiscal rectitude' and balanced budgets. (The contrast to his reverential tone when describing Roosevelt's character could not have been more marked.) Or I would hear him complain ruefully that Haberler, another policy nihilist of the Austrian School, voted against him in a close contest with Harry White for the prestigious Wells prize that would have guaranteed publication of his PhD dissertation.
v In these ways the real bills doctrine, the quantity theory, going off gold, deflation, liquidation, mass unemployment, prohibitionism, departmental rivalries and patronage, opportunistic Johnnies-come-lately to intellectual and social fashions (his own Harvard rival Seymour Harris being the most despised example), would no longer be colourless names or dry ideas (except the case for prohibition!). vi Instead, when struggling through a vast literature, I would often recall Currie's own vibrant take on the ideas and names that appeared before me. Thus I could fix and organise a mass of material into a more coherent story than would otherwise have been possible. No doubt this also biased my interpretations (usually, but not always, in favour of my subject's case), especially if subsequently I also had the opportunity to discuss the issues with him in person, as I often did. But the reader would surely get a more faithful impression of Currie's life, thought, and character than through a biographer without that advantage.
However, one incidental problem with writing Currie's life at the same time as he was still engrossed in his current writing and advisory work was that he was constantly badgering me to finish work on the early years and get up to date so I could spend more time discussing and helping him with his current work. He was very much a man of action, so "the past is poison" (as he once remarked ruefully, though in a different context) except as it provides useful lessons for today.
Naturally, the accompanying disadvantage of close association is the above-mentioned danger of lack of balance and an overly sympathetic, uncritical account of the subject's life. The biases can be reduced by contacting the subject's surviving friends and enemies.
The object is to write biography not hagiography. The danger is clearly greatest, as in my case, when writing about an associate who is still alive and will eventually read the book.
In this connection Charles P. Kindleberger (1991) I found the famous letter! I did some head shaking over it, but anyway our hearts were in the right place and our instincts were right, so what more can you ask?
Anyway, despite what Walter [Salant] says, the threat of a run on gold was present at that time and going off gold (a) removed that threat for the time being (b) gave the 'man in the street' a feeling of bold leadership and (c) eased the gold and liquidity situation for many years to come.
Why the head-shaking? The letter to Roosevelt concludes:
In the foregoing paragraphs, we may seem to have dwelt unduly upon the monetary means for recovery and reform. This emphasis arises from the immediacy of these problems. We would urge in conclusion, however, that we are not believers in the sole efficacy of monetary measures as a cure for our economic ills. Indeed, our primary interest is rather in the direction of your longer range programs for reform and here we feel admiration for the comprehensive view you have taken of the economic structure.
With hindsight, Currie has acknowledged that many of the regulations against big business, which in this letter he appears to have endorsed, were unhelpful to recovery. In Federal Income-Increasing Expenditures, 1933 -35, written in late 1935 or early 1936 with Martin Krost, he reported that any similarity between the "net contribution" and the reported cash deficit was purely coincidental. The reported budget could be in balance while the net contribution was in heavy deficit. Thus there was no necessary conflict between those who wanted a balanced budget and those who wanted the government to provide a stimulus: "By selecting income-increasing types of expenditure and nonincome-decreasing methods of raising revenue, it is conceivable that a balanced budget could be maintained and at the same time a considerable stimulus given to business."
Investment subsidies, for example, could have a powerful stimulatory effect while a tax on undistributed profits might have only a small negative effect. However, there was no doubt in Currie's mind that the conditions prevailing in the mid-1930s called for much more than a balanced expansion of taxes and spending.
The size of the required deficit, whether in its cash or its "net contribution" form, was calculated according to the size of potential, full-employment income (based on 1928
with adjustments for population and productivity growth) and the size of the leakages from that income that would need to be offset. If deficit finance was a precondition for the recovery of aggregate incomes and expenditures, it was also the main determinant of profits and business confidence. Strenuously opposing this view was Treasury Secretary
Henry Morgenthau who believed that deficits destroyed business confidence.
In the fall of 1937, as the economy was plunging into renewed depression, Currie came to FDR's personal attention when, on the urging of Harry Hopkins, the President met directly with Currie and two other technicians (Leon Henderson and Isador Lubin) for an unprecedented four-hour conference on November 8 in which "Curried-Keynesianism" was explained. The New York Post reported the next day that the advisers "minced no words in giving Roosevelt a hard-boiled review of economic conditions and with equal bluntness and vigor they told him that a disastrous recession can only be averted by a resumption of big-scale government spending." xii As Currie later recalled in his New
Deal memoirs (Sandilands, 2004, pp. 212-13) :
The President clearly did not understand what had happened to the recovery and was uncertain what to do. At this time he was receiving conflicting advice from many quarters. The conservatives were saying that the recession had been caused by the continued federal deficit (even though at that time the Federal Government was running a small cash surplus) and Morgenthau was influenced by their arguments.
They also maintained that the undistributed profits tax was a factor and demanded its repeal. The President's faith in the basic New Deal policy of deliberately increasing a deficit to increase consumer buying power was obviously shaken. In any case, I
always suspected that Roosevelt's adherence to that policy was based more on humanitarian than on economic grounds, despite his statements to the contrary that could be quoted. He was glad to use economic arguments for something he wanted to do on other grounds.
In those circumstances Hopkins, I believe it was, said to him "Mr. President, instead of always talking to the heads of departments, why don't you talk to the boys who While this memorandum did much to restore or strengthen faith in the necessity of planning and for the Government to assume more active responsibility for the course of economic activity it left me dissatisfied with my own failure to forecast the severity of the recession well in advance of its occurrence. It was hindsight rather than foresight. It was particularly aggravating because I was aware at the time of the drastic fall in the excess of government expenditures over receipts, of the rise in building costs and of the probable excess of production over consumption, the difference going into inventories. I became aware of the chief mental hazard attached to forecasting -the reluctance to take a strong stand that business is going to be very different than it actually is. I think that in part this reluctance arises not only from a fear of being wrong, but also from an implicit awareness of the absence of reliable and current quantitative data. In the then state of our economic data, one naturally hesitated in taking a strong position which went contrary to existing trends.
Morgenthau continued to oppose proposals to increase deficit spending, but a few months later Roosevelt finally swung in favour of the spenders and the economy pulled out of recession in late spring 1938.
It is widely believed that J. M. Keynes was the key figure in altering attitudes toward the proper role of government in securing full employment in a mainly free enterprise US (Sandilands, 1990, 83-7) .
In the White House in Peace and War, 1939-45
In June 1939 President Roosevelt phoned the chairman of the Federal Reserve Board.
Marriner Eccles (1951, p. 333) 3. I think you should know the basic economic theory that underlies the suggestions and positions taken by your assistant. In treating special problems I have the basic problem and solutions, as I see it, constantly in mind and although feasibility and timing must always be given proper weight, I try to fit every specialized problem into the broad program.
4. In connection with the pressure currently being brought on you to call a Conference on Unemployment, my view is very naturally that unless the conference can come out with the diagnosis and type of solution outlined in the attached memorandum it will be fruitless and probably harmful. Unless very carefully selected and stage managed, the likelihood of its so coming out is not promising.
5. You asked me to do some work on the problem of post-war reconstruction.
This problem is, however, but one special case of the overall problem of securing and maintaining full employment.
In conclusion, let me say that I don't for a moment think that this type of analysis can be sold politically. Its value lies solely in the proper orientation of our own thinking in developing a coordinated program. The program itself, I think, must be sold on the specific appeal of its component elements.
The memorandum is long but even so is greatly compressed. I should be delighted to go into greater detail on any points that you think are crucial and "unproven". After having had to interview and read the outpourings of numberless cranks and crackpots, I feel a little abashed at coming forward and saying, "I know the answer". I trust, however, that you will make the distinction! Currie's ostensible mission was to give China a budget. But the central government has no income to speak of. It simply prints notes… The average peasant pays 60% of his income (cash and crop) in rent. In return, the landlords, mainly militarists, are supposed to give the peasants police protection. But the militarists pay almost no taxes to Chiang's government. To make his budget, Currie apparently argued that
Chiang should stop being a front man for the landlords, and to take them into partnership instead, i.e., tax their incomes. Some of the income could then be routed back to the commodity-starved peasants via a benefit program. Thus inflation, hoarding, the feudal independence of the landlords and the political orphanhood of the peasants would all be attacked at once. It dawned on the Generalissimo that he could overnight become a popular leader on the Roosevelt model if he let the peasants feel that the nationalist war, in addition to being a war for China's freedom, was also a war for social justice. We must be firm, however, and our course thus far is correct. (Freidel, 1990, p. 602) Currie left his position at the White House in June 1945 to go into business as an economic consultant in New York until he was recruited by the World Bank to head a comprehensive country study of Colombia in 1949-50. His mission report was published in September 1950 at which point the Colombian government appointed him as advisor to a committee set up to study the report and act on its recommendations (Sandilands, 1990; Alacevich, 2005 Fraser, Canada (1967 -1971 ), Glasgow (1968 -1969 ), and Oxford (1969 He was a regular teacher at the major universities in Bogotá and published widely in international journals. His writings were heavily influenced by his Harvard mentor Allyn Young. A paper on Youngian endogenous growth theory was published posthumously (Currie, 1997) , pieced together by the present writer from several incomplete drafts, notes and tabulations that were on his desk when he died, and that are now among his papers at Duke University. On the day before he died, of heart failure, President Cesar Gaviria presented him with Colombia's highest honor, the Gran Cruz de Boyacá, for services to his adopted country. (Phillips, 1995) , in which Currie's 1934 proposal for a 100 percent reserve banking system was discussed, Currie wrote that 'Viner was a very able economist but not very daring… I doubt if he passed my paper [on the 100 percent reserves plan] to Morgenthau, who was also timid'.
x I am indebted for this information to Hansjoerg Klausinger, working on Machlup's archives, and to Masazumi Wakatabe who sent me the Washington Post and New York Times letters.
xi The original formal mathematical statement of the balanced-budget multiplier theorem was by Walter Salant's brother William while he was an assistant to Currie in the early 1940s. In various unpublished memoranda written in the late 1970s, Currie again questioned the practical relevance of the theorem, and also criticised its assumption that a rise in the tax rate would have no effect on the marginal propensity to save or, as Currie would prefer to express it, on the marginal propensity to hold money in the face of a need to replenish depleted cash balances. In the latter case the value of any multiplier effect would be far less than unity.
xii Extracts of the report that was laid before the President are included in 'Editor's Introduction' (Sandilands, 2004, pp. 185-6) . The full report and contemporary newspaper commentaries are in the Currie archive at Duke University.
xiii This was subsequently published, with an introduction by Byrd Jones, in Currie (1980) . xiv For Young's influence on Currie's monetary economics see Sandilands (1990, chapter 2) and Laidler (1993 Laidler ( , pp. 1083 ; and for his influence on Currie's thinking on development economics see Currie (1997) and Mehrling and Sandilands (1999, p. xi) . xv Currie was the first professional economist to work as a presidential adviser in the White House. The Employment Act of 1946 formalised this role with the creation of the Council of Economic Advisers. One of Currie's postgraduate students at Simon Fraser University, 1967-68, was Martin Neil Baily who was appointed by President Clinton as Chairman of the CEA in 1999.
